Daily Dialectic

I have presented two views on self-deception. According to one view, this action is modelled on other-deception. However, this understanding supposedly generates paradoxes. I have talked about two ways to resolve them. The first is to posit divisions in the mind and the second is to deny that self-deception is modelled on other-deception. I have said that the traditional understanding of other-deception is improper and that this is what generates paradoxes.

Then, I have presented what I see to be the most problematic case of self-deception and then I have argued that paradoxes do not arise in this case either because having epistemic reasons to believe something does not secure believing that thing. I believe that in the most problematic case, self-deceiver believes that “the evidence suggests that p” and that “not-p”. That is, in normal English, I can believe that “the evidence suggests that my wife is having an affair” and that “my wife is not having an affair” because these two beliefs are not contradictory. Hence, we do not need to posit divisions in the mind.