Daily Dialectic

All good philosophers know that the only truly satisfying inquiry is an infinitely dense and totally reflective deliberative singularity of infinite duration involving maximally plural beings (living and/or dead).

But pragmatists disagree. They need to believe in lines in the sand between inquiry-projects simply to get results, and Peirce explains why that’s epistemologically inescapable. Inquiry as praxis in the real world requires that we wind back our expectations of ‘truth-seeking’, reconsider the aims of inquiry, and be satisfied with our ability to ‘settle’ on beliefs that solve problems rather than Know the Truth.

But some people just won’t play ball, and they threaten the whole enterprise of inquiry by exploiting the conditions of fallibilism. Peirce won’t stand for the evangelists of methodological egalitarianism at the disciplinary gates, and he has all the reasons he needs.

But can Peirce really help us when a pseudo-scientist demands that the science faculty admit his UFO conspiracy projects at UQ?